The economic literature on conflict employs a static, game-theoretic framework developed by Jack Hirshleifer. The authors introduce conflict dynamics into a model with two rival groups, each dependent on a single contested renewable resource. The model is based on two stylized facts: conflict often arises over scarce renewable resources, and those resources often lack well-defined and/or enforceable property rights. In each period, groups allocate their members between resource harvesting and resource appropriation (or conflict) to maximize their income. This leads to a complex nonlinear dynamic interaction between conflict, the two populations, and the resource. As developed, the model relates most closely to conflict over renewable resources in primitive societies. The system's global dynamics are investigated in simulations calibrated for the historical society of Easter Island. The model's implications for contemporary lesser developed societies are examined.
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