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The Formation of Mutual Insurers in Markets with Adverse Selection
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The Formation of Mutual Insurers in Markets with Adverse Selection (2005)The Formation of Mutual Insurers in Marke…The Ownership of Enterprise (2000)The Ownership of EnterpriseThe Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods (1996)The Theory of Externalities, …Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Production, Information Costs…Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995)Firms, Contracts, and Financi…Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt (1992)Insiders and Outsiders: The C…Standard Risk Aversion (1991)Standard Risk AversionProperty Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Property Rights and the Natur…Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation (1990)Financial Intermediaries and …The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Own…Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Separation of Ownership and C…Agency Problems and Residual Claims (1983)Agency Problems and Residual …Informational Equilibrium (1979)Informational EquilibriumA model of insurance markets with incomplete information (1977)A model of insurance markets …Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Equilibrium in Competitive In…Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market (1962)Equilibrium in a Reinsurance …A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures (1956)A Pure Theory of Local Expend…The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Law and Finance (1998)Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)Determinants of corporate borrowing (1977)Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends (1984)What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data (1995)Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints? (1997)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Formal and Real Authority in Organizations (1997)Unbundling Institutions (2005)Towards a Theory of Ecosystems (2018)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Higher education as a filter (1973)Job Market Signaling (1973)INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION (1977)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Understanding and Mitigating Uncertainty in Online Exchange Relationships: A Principal–Agent Perspective1 (2007)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context (2011)Theory of Value (1959)Auditor size and audit quality (1981)Strategic assets and organizational rent (1993)Toward a knowledge‐based theory of the firm (1996)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance (2007)Endogenous Technological Change (1989)Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving (1990)Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics (2000)Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition (1974)What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research? (2002)Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement (2005)
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References

  • 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
  • 1956A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures13,471 cited
  • 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
  • 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
  • 1990Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm5,407 cited
  • 1976Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information5,032 cited
  • 1983Agency Problems and Residual Claims4,877 cited
  • 1995Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure4,671 cited
  • 1992Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt3,902 cited
  • 1996The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods2,689 cited
  • 2000The Ownership of Enterprise1,427 cited
  • 1990Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation1,078 cited
  • 1977A model of insurance markets with incomplete information1,036 cited
  • 1991Standard Risk Aversion851 cited
  • 1962Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market700 cited
  • 1979Informational Equilibrium

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