Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model

Jeffrey S. Banks

69 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Mathematical Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence

Abstract

When the dimension of the outcome space in a voting game is sufficiently high, a core outcome will fail to exist for almost all utility profiles. Previous work by Schofield and McKelvey has identified critical dimensions for this generic non-existence, employing results on singularities of mappings and transversal intersections. In this paper we demonstrate that their proofs are incorrect, and determine the right dimensions implied by their singularity approach.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 69 citations exist upstream.

References

1967A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule 1973On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule 1987Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point 1979Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives 1983Generic Instability of Majority Rule 1986Structural instability of the core 1984Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets

Cited by

2005Social Choice and Strategic Decisions 2008A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces 2007The Spatial Model of Politics 2002Chapter 1 Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework 2005Introduction and Overview

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.