Politics, Policy, and Bureaucracy at the Top

Abstract

Innovation reflecting presidential priorities stems in part from the interplay among political appointees and senior civil servants. Members within each set share distinctive capabilities and disabilities. The brief tenure of political appointees, along with the two-year interval between elections, imposes short time perspectives on political executives, in contrast to those of career executives. The large number of political appointees and their initial distrust of the bureaucracy reduce the contribution that careerists might make to the development and implementation of policies. This is a serious loss, given many political appointees' lack of governmental experience and weak preparation for managing or operating within large organizations. Most career executives are disposed to adapt to a new administration's policy initiatives; resistance is as likely among political executives when the president changes course. Centrifugal forces disperse policymaking into overly discrete, semiautonomous compartments. Centripetal forces draw policymaking to the White House staff, whose members are only occasionally qualified for such responsibility. Reducing the number of political appointees would permit more discriminating selection and lead to greater involvement of careerists. However, careerist's preparation for a larger role needs improvement.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 9 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.