Assumptions about children's best interests

Abstract

The family justice system operates with a set of presumptions and assumptions about the welfare of the child which are assumed to be based on 'scientific' knowledge and which, therefore, are further assumed to carry the authority of both science and law. In practice, the result is that those working within the family justice system use powerful 'legal'notions whose provenance is often taken for granted and whose authority is unchallenged. Drawing on the different sets of assumptions operating in the family justice system and the youth justice system, this article explains, however, that law responds to messages originating in external discourses, notably science and politics, only in so far as its functions require and only in ways which 'fit'into legal communications. Viewed in this light, the presumptions are seen as working guidelines which should only be used with great care when dealing with the lives of children and young people. Whilst acknowledging that a full investigation of all children's cases would not be feasible, this article therefore argues for greater attention to the applicability and validity of prevailing presumptions.

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