The Government as a Shareholder: A Case from the United States

Stacey R. Kole · J. Harold Mulherin

191 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Law and Economics

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Corporate Finance and Governance Political Influence and Corporate Strategies State Capitalism and Financial Governance

Abstract

We study a sample of U.S. corporations in which the federal government held 35–100 percent of the outstanding common stock for between 1 and 23 years during and following World War II. We find that although the firms experienced abnormally high turnover among corporate board members, the tenure of senior management was relatively stable. Moreover, the performance of the government‐owned companies was not significantly different than that of private‐sector firms in the same industry. Hence, the interim government custodianship of the firms in our case does not have the effects normally attributed to government ownership.

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References

1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm 1994The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis 1988The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations 1989Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises 1979Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination 1965Some Economics of Property Rights 1991Negotiated Block Trades and Corporate Control 1980The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian Railroads

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