Alternative tradable credit scheme on general transportation network

Abstract

This paper designs and analyzes an alternative tradable travel credit scheme on general transportation network for managing travelers’ route choice behaviors. The scheme is a kind of charging and rewarding mechanism, which provides an attempt to urge travelers to plan their travel routes reasonably so that excessive traffic congestion can be mitigated. Mobility credits are imposed on those travelers who use high congested routes, while rewarded credits are given to those travelers who switch to the low congested routes. A free tradable market is created such that the travelers paying credits can purchase them from those earning them from the rewarding travel route choices. When the total amount of credits earned is equal to the amount of credits consumed, transfer of wealth can only take place among the travelers and hence overcome the inequity problem of congestion pricing. On the general transportation network, the type of tradable credit schemes can be formulated as a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraint (MPEC) model. Based on the model, a credit charging mechanism is obtained under the system optimum and Pareto-improving system optimum conditions.

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