Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains

Bengt R. Holmstrom

413 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

It is proved that Groves’ scheme is unique on restricted domains which are smoothly connected, in particular convex domains. This generalizes earlier uniqueness results by Green and Laffont and Walker. An example shows that uniqueness may be lost if the domain is not smoothly connected.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 413 citations exist upstream.

References

1951Social Choice and Individual Values.1973Incentives in Teams 1971Multipart pricing of public goods 1977Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods 1980Incentives in Public Decision-Making.1975Incentives and public inputs 1977On incentives and control in organizations

Cited by

2008Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals 1980A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 2006Optimal decision-making with minimal waste 2006An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search 2004Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency 2017Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources 2019Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction 1980On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.