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Input Control in Agricultural Production Contracts
8 references·6 citing·49 second hop
Input Control in Agricultural Production Contracts (1999)Input Control in Agricultural Production …The Economics of Contracts: A Primer (1997)The Economics of Contracts: A…Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry Vertical Integration (1996)Information Asymmetry as a Re…Case studies in contracting and organization (1996)Case studies in contracting a…Econometrics of First-Price Auctions (1995)Econometrics of First-Price A…Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production (1994)Testing the Theory of Tournam…Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results (1992)Agency Theory and Franchising…A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers (1989)A Real Game of Chicken: Contr…Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts (1986)Incentives, Learning, and Com…Institutional Change, Contracts, and Quality in Transition Agriculture (2009)Institutional Change, Contrac…Allocation of Decision Rights in Fruit and Vegetable Contracts in China (2009)Allocation of Decision Rights…Contract production of peas (2003)Contract production of peasTen rules of thumb in contract design: lessons from Danish agriculture (2002)Ten rules of thumb in contrac…Contract use widespread in wine grape industry (2002)Contract use widespread in wi…THE AGRICULTURAL INPUT INDUSTRY AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN AGRICULTURE (1999)THE AGRICULTURAL INPUT INDUST…The Economics of Post-Communist Transition (1998)The effects of foreign direct investment on domestic firms (2001)FDI and economic growth: the role of local financial markets (2003)Marketing, cooperatives and price heterogeneity: evidence from the CIS dairy sector (2011)Small farmers, standards, value chains, and structural change: panel evidence from Bulgaria (2015)Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations (1979)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)The role of risk in contract choice (1999)Losing to Win: Tournament Incentives in the National Basketball Association (2002)A New Institutional Approach to Organization (2008)Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics (1983)The choice of organizational form The case of franchising (1987)Relationship Marketing and Distribution Channels (1995)The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives (2002)Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives (2003)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers (1998)Cooperative or Controlling? The Effects of CEO-Board Relations and the Content of Interlocks on the Formation of Joint Ventures (1999)Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets (2000)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)ESTIMATION OF A DYNAMIC AUCTION GAME (2003)User Heterogeneity and its Impact on Electronic Auction Market Design: An Empirical Exploration1 (2004)Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples) (2007)Simulation and the Monte Carlo Method (2016)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Pay Equality and Industrial Politics (1989)Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources (2007)Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars (2011)TEAM INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM A FIRM LEVEL EXPERIMENT (2013)The Nature of the Firm (1937)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)Gains from quota trade: theoretical models and an application to the Danish fishery (2007)Contractual arrangements and enforcement in transition agriculture: Theory and evidence from China (2008)Competition in U.S. Farm Product Markets: Do Long‐Run Incentives Trump Short‐Run Market Power? (2012)Governing the project process: a conceptual framework (2001)On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration (2003)What is project governance and what are its origins? (2013)Bargaining and War (2000)The Economics and Psychology of Personality Traits (2008)Inside and Outside Liquidity (2011)Contracts and Quality in the California Winegrape Industry (2003)Reputations, Market Structure, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems in the Food Industry (2007)A Century of Research on Agricultural Markets (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1992Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results1,120 cited
  • 1997The Economics of Contracts: A Primer582 cited
  • 1986Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts475 cited
  • 1995Econometrics of First-Price Auctions352 cited
  • 1994Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production333 cited
  • 1996Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry Vertical Integration196 cited
  • 1989A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers180 cited
  • 1996Case studies in contracting and organization150 cited

Cited by

  • 2002Ten rules of thumb in contract design: lessons from Danish agriculture88 cited
  • 2009Institutional Change, Contracts, and Quality in Transition Agriculture29 cited
  • 2009Allocation of Decision Rights in Fruit and Vegetable Contracts in China16 cited
  • 1999THE AGRICULTURAL INPUT INDUSTRY AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN AGRICULTURE14 cited
  • 2003Contract production of peas14 cited
  • 2002Contract use widespread in wine grape industry13 cited

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