Psychopaths and Moral Knowledge

Abstract

Neil Levy argues that empirical data shows that psychopaths lack the moral knowledge required for moral responsibility. His account is intriguing, and it offers a promising way to think about the significance of psychopaths for work on moral responsibility. In what follows we focus on three lines of concern connected to Levy's account: his interpretation of the data, the scope of exculpation, and the significance of biological explanations for anti-social behavior. 1. The moral/conventional distinction In this section we'll argue that (1) Levy overclaims what the data show about the moral/conventional distinction; (2) the moral/conventional distinction does not neatly enough track any facts about moral knowledge and moralized judgments to warrant the implications he draws from the data; (3) the nature of morality matters, and cursory consideration of some metaethical issues suggests that we may be better of supposing psychopaths can be responsible, at least sometimes; and (4) even if all the preceding points (1-3) are false, it is still not clear why a grasp of purely conventional norms is not sufficient to ground responsibility, in at least some cases. First, Levy draws on data from Blair to conclude that psychopathsi “fail to grasp the

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