The Limits to Libertarian Paternalism: Two New Critiques and Seven Best-Practice Imperatives

Abstract

Behavioural economists argue that humans are predictably irrational in various ways, as a result of which there appears to be a role for public policy in improving their decision making. We of er a sympathetic critique of this so-called ‘libertarian paternalist’ approach. As well as reviewing existing critiques, we present two new arguments. First, we question whether policies which are not beneficial to the individuals they target can be justified within a libertarian paternalist framework, even if they contribute to the social good. Second, we highlight the potentially adverse consequences of poorly targeted libertarian paternalist interventions. In the penultimate section we bring together the existing critiques and the new arguments to of er seven best-practice imperatives for the careful application of these powerful, but easily misused, tools of government. We conclude with a brief reflection on what freedom might mean in the context of libertarian paternalist governance.

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