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The opening pages of the Cratylus, 383-395, contain an argument the conclusion of which is that names belong to things by nature; they do not belong to things by virtue of conventions or agreements. The argument is, I think, as good as any analogical argument can be:' it ought to convince or at least give pause to a reflective person; any objection to the argument seems ad hoc. In section I of what follows I will present and argue for an interpretation of the argument which justifies this view of it. My interpretation, however, leaves many questions unanswered. It avoids discussion of what Plato means by Form of name. It does not clarify what Plato believes a name to be or show what could explain why, e.g., the name horse is a name of horses, if conventions do not. In section II, a somewhat more speculative section than the first, I will argue that the Proper Forms of name are the meanings of names or words. Once this is established and the theory of names that is contained in the shuttle analogy is spelled out, the other questions become relatively easy to deal with.
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