Law as a Moral Idea

Abstract

Abstract The nature of law is best understood as the expression of a moral idea: the idea of freedom as independence from the power of another. The moral value of law is not contingent upon circumstance, but inherent in its character as law. In making these claims, the book seeks to move jurisprudence closer to an older tradition of philosophical reflection upon law, exemplified by Hobbes and Kant. Most contemporary legal theorists view the understanding of existing institutions as quite distinct from any enterprise of moral reflection. But the relationship between institutions and moral ideas can be much more intimate than this approach would suggest. Some institutions can be understood only as imperfect attempts to realise moral or political ideas, and some ideas can be understood only by reference to their expression in institutions.

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