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The Iffiest Oughts: A Guise of Reasons Account of End‐Given Conditionals
11 references·4 citing·34 second hop
The Iffiest Oughts: A Guise of Reasons Account of End‐Given Conditionals (2009)The Iffiest Oughts: A Guise of Reasons Ac…Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (2012)Groundwork for the Metaphysic…Wide or Narrow Scope? (2007)Wide or Narrow Scope?State or Process Requirements? (2007)State or Process Requirements?Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom (2007)Practical Reasons, Practical …Why Be Rational? (2005)Why Be Rational?The Myth of Instrumental Rationality (2005)The Myth of Instrumental Rati…The Scope of Instrumental Reason (2004)The Scope of Instrumental Rea…Normative Requirements (1999)Normative RequirementsVirtue and Reason (1979)Virtue and ReasonConditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives (1975)Conditional Oughts and Hypoth…The Hypothetical Imperative (1973)The Hypothetical ImperativeDesiring under the Proper Guise (2019)Desiring under the Proper Gui…Conflicting reasons, unconflicting ‘ought’s (2015)Conflicting reasons, unconfli…Meta‐normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive (2013)Meta‐normative Realism, Evolu…Instrumental rationality, symmetry and scope (2010)Instrumental rationality, sym…The Moral Problem (1994)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (2006)Ought , Agents, and Actions (2010)Reason‐Giving and the Law (2011)Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle (2015)On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others (1968)Values and the Heart's Command (1973)Is Rationality Normative? (2007)Reasoning under Scarcity (2016)If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It (2018)The Sources of Normativity (1996)Against Content Normativity (2009)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons (2008)Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid (2013)The Epistemic and the Zetetic (2020)Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason (2007)Moral Realism (2003)Ethics Without Principles (2004)Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020)Decisions, Reasons, and Rationality (2008)The symmetry of rational requirements (2010)Respect and the reality of apparent reasons (2020)TRUST: THE CONNECTING LINK BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS (1995)COMPETITION, COOPERATION, AND THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC RENTS: A SYNCRETIC MODEL (1997)Who Displays Ethical Leadership, and Why Does It Matter? An Examination of Antecedents and Consequences of Ethical Leadership (2012)Oughts and ends (2008)What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it (2009)What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!) (2016)What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? (2004)The Nature of Normativity (2007)The Philosophy of Sociality (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2012Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals3,730 cited
  • 1979Virtue and Reason1,642 cited
  • 1999Normative Requirements803 cited
  • 2005Why Be Rational?708 cited
  • 2005The Myth of Instrumental Rationality294 cited
  • 1975Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives183 cited
  • 2004The Scope of Instrumental Reason153 cited
  • 2007Wide or Narrow Scope?136 cited
  • 1973The Hypothetical Imperative124 cited
  • 2007State or Process Requirements?74 cited
  • 2007Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom42 cited

Cited by

  • 2010Instrumental rationality, symmetry and scope36 cited
  • 2019Desiring under the Proper Guise35 cited
  • 2013Meta‐normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive31 cited
  • 2015Conflicting reasons, unconflicting ‘ought’s26 cited

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