Reduction, Stasis, and Expansion of Budgets in Advanced Democracies

Abstract

This article investigates changes within national budget by examining actors’ behavioral predilections and the institutional constraints under which they operate. The article presents three theoretical propositions about the influence of attention and institutions on all magnitudes of programmatic budget changes ranging from large cuts to massive expansions. Using quantile regression, the author is able to uncover which distinct processes bear on cuts, stasis, and expansion across spending categories within a budget. An examination of budgetary data from Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States from 1964 to 1999 leads to the conclusion that attention shifts lead to contractions and expansions of budgetary items, whereas preference-based explanations have marginal support. In addition, institutional costs involved in budgetary politics amplify budgetary shifts. The author closes the article by discussing the implications of the findings for partisan theories of government and institutional theories.

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