How Time Affects EU Decision-Making

Abstract

In a recent article in this journal, Golub demonstrated that, in order to understand the determinants of legislative decision-making speed in the European Union and their theoretical implications, it is essential for analysts to fit survival models that do not make assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard rate and that account for variables whose value and effect may change over time (Golub, 2007).To improve upon earlier findings that ignored these issues, he fit a Cox model with time-interaction terms that allow non-proportional effects to data on the 1669 proposed directives made between 1968 and 1998.The inclusion of these time-interaction terms was based on the well-known tests of proportionality (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001).Although correct, the interpretation of the results of such a model is less straightforward than he recognized.In this paper we explain how to make sense of the estimates from survival models that contain timeinteraction terms, and then investigate how a more precise interpretation affects Golub's findings.Overall, we draw three main conclusions: the effect that formal qualified majority voting (QMV) rules have on speeding up decision-making is even larger and more consistent than originally claimed; the trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy is more complicated than first thought; and the effects of some key variables do not just wear off but actually reverse direction once proposals survive long periods of time.

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