The World and Truth About What Is Not

Abstract

Truth requires an explanation, or ontological ground, of sorts.1 One way of articulating this requirement is to say that things, broadly construed, are the ontological ground of truths and, therefore, that things make truths true. Call the claim that things make truths true Truthmaker. Call the claim that all non-analytic truths are made true by things Max, which I will formulate as follows: Necessarily, for all non-analytic propositions p, if is true, then there is some thing(s) E and is true in virtue of E.2 Recently, there have been a number of arguments purporting to show that if one embraces Truthmaker, then one ought to embrace Max.3 Some philosophers who accept this conditional, such as Mumford and Cameron, do a modus ponens and embrace Max.4 Others, such as Merricks and Dodd, do a modus tollens and reject Truthmaker.5 It is my belief that the conditional is false. One can embrace Truthmaker without being obligated to embrace Max. My discussion is divided into three main parts. In section I, I present arguments given in the literature in favour of accepting the relevant conditional. These arguments are given in the context of considering whether or not negative existentials have truthmakers. As such, the arguments conclude specifically that if one wants to accept Truthmaker, then one ought to posit truthmakers for negative existentials. In section II, I take a look at two recent attempts by Ross Cameron and Jonathan Schaffer to provide truthmakers for negative existentials by appealing to the world, weigh those attempts, and find them wanting. In section III, I argue that the relevant conditional is false by considering worlds where we have good reasons to doubt Max but not Truthmaker. A much talked about reason to reject Max is the claim that negative and general truths—x does not exist, x is not F, all x are F—lack truthmakers. But many find in this rejection of Max a reason to reject Truthmaker. Trenton Merricks (TO, pp. 40–43) gives three such arguments focusing on negative existentials. They are as follows: (1) If truthmakers could be found for negative existentials, then truthmaker theorists would accept such truthmakers. But this suggests that the only reason some truthmaker theorists reject Max is the fact that finding truthmakers for negative existentials has proved difficult. (2) Our truthmaker intuition is that every truth depends on being. We do not have the gerrymandered intuition that all truths, except truths about what does not exist, depend on being. Truthmakers for every truth, except true negative existentials, thus ‘fails to be motivated by any other compelling intuition about truth's dependence on being’ (p. 41). (3) Given that E makes true, and that entails, in the relevant way, some negative existential , and that therefore E makes true, then truthmaker theorists are committed to truthmakers for some negative existentials.6 But then, Merricks (p. 43) claims, all negative existentials should have truthmakers, for ‘it would then be both unprincipled and unmotivated to persist in saying that other true negative existentials lack truthmakers’.7 Arguments 1, 2 and 3 are all indictments of ad-hockery. There is no independent reason to reject Max once Truthmaker is accepted. David Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers, p. 70) argues along similar lines claiming that if one simply asserts that negative existentials do not have truthmakers, then this ‘seems to be nothing more than giving up on truthmakers as soon as the going gets hard’. Julian Dodd (‘Negative Truths’, p. 394) agrees, saying: The intuition that truth must be ontologically grounded in the sense explicated by [Truthmaker] is an intuition concerning (non-analytic) truth in general: it is one particular way of trying to explain the intuition that what is true is determined by how things are, but not vice versa. Consequently … it would seem to be a failure of nerve to depart from this general [Truthmaker] principle in the wake of the problem of finding truthmakers for negative truths. Finally, Ross Cameron (TM, p. 411) says: If we don't get the negative truths for free given the positive truths, then what possible motivation could there be for accepting that some truths require truthmakers but that negative truths don’t? That would be to accept that the negative truths are not true in virtue of anything: but if we allow that then why do we not allow positive truths that are not true in virtue of anything? As I see it, the central objection to accepting Truthmaker while rejecting Max just is that it is ad hoc. The truth of propositions in general needs to be explained. True propositions in general require an ontological ground. But, then it would seem that negative truths require an explanation just as much as positive truths. After all, if eclipses in general stand in need of an explanation, then so do lunar eclipses and not just solar eclipses. But then if true propositions in general stand in need of an explanation, then so do negative truths and not just positive truths. Consequently, exempting negative existentials from requiring truthmakers simply because finding such truthmakers has proved difficult will not do. Either one must provide a non-ad hoc reason for exempting negative existentials from requiring truthmakers or, in the absence of other reasons to reject Max, accept Max. If there is no non-ad hoc reason, then those who think Truthmaker true have the burden of providing suitable truthmakers for negative existentials. And it is the burden of providing suitable truthmakers for negative existentials that I turn to next. Three types of candidates have been offered to play the role of truthmakers for negative existentials: absences, totality facts, and the world. The philosophical discussion over absences and totality facts is rather large and a good deal has been said both in favour of and against them. Since I have nothing new to say with respect to whether or not we should admit such entities into our ontology, and since I think that the criticisms levelled against them render their existence implausible, I will instead focus my attention on the world.8 According to Ross Cameron and Jonathan Schaffer, it is the actual concrete world, which I will henceforth refer to as ‘U ’ (for universe), that is the truthmaker for true negative existentials.9 Moreover, what Cameron and Schaffer seem to be providing us with is the type of truthmaker one needs for true negative existentials simpliciter, and not merely the type of truthmaker one actually needs for true negative existentials. And if so, then since it is necessary that there are true negative existentials, it follows that it is necessary that there is a concrete world that makes these negative existentials true. We can sum up this view, which I will call The Worldly as follows: Necessarily, some concrete world such that it is the for all true negative existentials. I will in the of this that we should be in accepting The Worldly as we will soon from and since my of their depends on this the will require that I make this Cameron wants truthmakers to the truths make true (TM, p. If E makes true, then if E is true. In then for to make negative existentials true, it has to that are true. And in for it to do Cameron pp. that the has to be true of The world, I is of the truthmakers for the positive truths, and is of nothing of any truthmakers, and nothing of any more truthmakers, could be our world … with said that our world could at possible world where there are that the in that world are not a of the that is actually our world. we need to is the claim that the world is that no possible can be the that is actually our world it is a that there with the claims, the claim that the world with that actually exist, in which it is a suitable truthmaker for any negative Given that is of all and only the actual truthmakers for positive truths, and given that is a world, then it will the negative existential truths that it makes true. in for to make negative existentials true, it has to be of that it is of all the truthmakers for positive truths and no that it is the there and that nothing other than what actually Cameron is in giving this The world is from these truthmakers, and is from just them. (p. The world is in that it without being a that it be a of (p. I claim that the is by it being of what it is actually of and by being the that there (p. It is of the of the world that nothing other than what actually (p. us focus on the that the world is in that it be a of what to the that one of is not being a of is the the not being a of some of the that totality a totality fact is the fact that these facts are all the it is the fact that these facts have the being such that are all the facts, an of the general being such that are all the But, this is a or since it that and no more than are the a is by Merricks and as by Cameron as while Dodd and it, a negative the fact of which it is a a negative that the not being a of is a since it that is such that nothing has it as a In to Cameron, not being a of should be an of a this of what a According to Cameron, if a all x and and if x at then x has the at that it has in virtue of at then that is The is in the for pp. should make a to how their are a should make a to the of the at the of But not being a of this makes no to There are of of that are of by we should not admit such into our do no But then, Cameron, does not have this as of But then, Cameron, is not a suitable truthmaker for negative existentials. with respect to of it would that not much is in to of The Worldly over to totality there any to this If there are, are going to require that it is not of the of that it is not a of so as has this as of then has as of a Moreover, there are to this are going to have to do the Cameron wants them to do while one to the true negative existentials. If has this as of then will be both the truthmaker for negative existentials and will not require that it not being a of But this will not do. it There a reason why Cameron has the said it so to explain why is an truthmaker for negative existentials. But in of and it with the of negative existentials true, one gets the that no explanation for why is an truthmaker for negative existentials has been One has merely what to be and made it of in to explain why is an Moreover, the true negative existentials at to a there are of of that do not make negative existentials true since these are not They are rather of this does not make a to how this should to Cameron, there any other we could to that both to explain why and concrete worlds in are truthmakers for negative existentials and are to of what a I think of And I have an for that there are not and an of where is a of some If is to make negative existentials true and is not is not a concrete world but merely a of then there must be some in the that and But this in it is not an by and are this in makes no to But then by it is a But then it be as of an explanation for why and not is a suitable truthmaker for negative existentials. Since this of there are no we could to that both to explain why concrete worlds are suitable truthmakers for negative existentials and are not Jonathan Schaffer has a in to which the depend on the a to there is only one concrete depend on it and that is the world. Schaffer this and that it, in with the claim that the world is the one and only to the of negative existentials. is will not every true negative existential as we have must reject this the truth, , and an world, where an of and a to in it is not that is since it is not that is the concrete world. It is rather that is we have a in what is In the actual world, it is that is but in the that both and a it is We have a in In the actual world is true but in the that both and a it is false. for this in A in the world. As Schaffer pp. says: any in the truth of must from some in what is If there can only be one and it is the world, then any in the truth of can only from a in the world. the one as the world, and in so the truth of that and are similar not say that it is that makes negative existentials true. for Cameron, concrete worlds are not but are worlds p. Schaffer, concrete worlds are but are not worlds p. while both say that concrete worlds are the truthmakers for true negative existentials, on what concrete worlds have to be in to play the the problem for of The Worldly is not being at all that makes true every true negative In Schaffer p. is in us what of is says: I should that I only with actual concrete and actual in other than are not my and if such there are not my I of the I of the and and other parts. it is only actual concrete that Schaffer has in in the that the depend on the play no role in And this should be arguments in favour of only favour things in the world the of the things in such a is arguments for are as follows sense the of the in of sense that the is an and therefore that the us with good that the is an and there is good reason to as the that as is with the of worlds where has a that these three arguments in favour of are all with respect to whether or not are grounded in the that sense that the is an is with respect to the of That the is an and therefore an is on how the to And need not be grounded in the in to have a in the arguments that Schaffer in of do not the claim that depend on the the arguments in favour of accepting only favour in the concrete world. They do not favour such as in the world. That do not favour saying that exist, or that do not exist, is grounded in the world. But then do not favour saying that truths about are and therefore made true, by the world. the reasons given in favour of accepting are on whether truths such as are grounded in the world. And so these reasons do not favour saying that a in the truth of from some in the what we need is an for that the world both and and therefore makes true truths about both and is such an If all are grounded in as are to then is grounded in what to it to such as to from things that are not the world to the world, then this is how which are things that are not the world, are grounded in the world. I see no reason to accept this conditional a relevant and But that there is a relevant and is by no it would not at all be to think that the only the and a and in the existence of things, to any of in a of of this from accepting that depend on as Schaffer But why As I the arguments in favour of do not us this And saying that we should this because if we we can have a truthmaker for every true negative existential about is of we can many things that are such if we we can have a truthmaker for every true negative existential about If depend on the existence of two then, for the reasons for that makes true all true negative existentials about if depend on two would make true all true negative existentials about But this gives us reason to think that are grounded in two we need are independent reasons to think that depend on two what we need are independent reasons for that depend on of this is But it is a And the is to up with reasons for that depend on If such reasons are then we can into philosophical concerning the of those Since I of the I be that such reasons are But at I would have reasons to be And or so I will for truthmakers for negative existentials is There is nothing ad hoc in accepting Truthmaker while Max. the that if one embraces Truthmaker, then one ought to embrace Max, and if think that we have good reasons not to embrace we have good reasons to think that absences, totality facts, and the world are not truthmakers for negative should think that we have good reason not to embrace Truthmaker. those to Truthmaker, as I my is to reject that if one embraces Truthmaker, then one ought to embrace Max. In to do this a non-ad hoc reason needs to be given that Truthmaker should not obligated to embrace Max. In whether we need truthmakers for of truth, and if we what of truthmakers we I think the of focusing on and worlds then the of all the world, where no concrete and the of truths in the , , , If the world if there no concrete things, then it would be true that there are no no and no But in the world, what the role of all these truths hoc In to us the as follows: It is in trying to what needs to in to make some truth true, to to does have to in to make some what does have to in to make it true that or I would do we are If then would be true. us to negative existentials. does have to in to make it true that there are no If not to then there would be nothing if there is to be and so would be true and, nothing would make it But the world in which nothing just is the world. the world us with a non-ad hoc reason to think that at the world, negative existential truths do not require is way of at that has all the wants to make some of these such as , true. But in to do so, has to the world. In has to the world with But what does have to do to make is on of existentials true for They are on the as I to it, that are true is the the has to in for them to be true. But has to in for them to be false. But think that the world is for more on this That is I only to focus on us from the world to a world just more than the world, world, where the only concrete that is an this world, does it seem we have a truthmaker for If it then the must in some sense or relevant to the existence or of But this is The existence of one is not relevant to the truth or of the it would be to say that all to do to make true is an an is there it to the truth or of I claim then that these worlds make the positive existentials and negative existentials If there or only a then would be true and nothing would make it But it is to say that could be true and nothing would make it And so there to be a truthmaker positive and negative existentials. It is this that is in to show that truthmaker theorists are not obligated to accept in to show that there is nothing ad hoc in the existence of truthmakers for positive existentials but them for negative existentials. And so, I it does not that if one embraces Truthmaker, then one ought on of ad embrace Max. that on such as the and to the what I is our intuition concerning negative existentials and truthmakers for them. I with says: what makes a true such as are no is a lack of … it is just to think that we must for a lack by the existence of … truths are true because things exist, and it is to and this in of the existence of The reason given Truthmaker, many have not with is to our considering only and such as the actual world, in trying to if negative existential truths are the type of truth that require truthmakers. Since these worlds are and with concrete truthmakers for all of truths, the of that there must be truthmakers for negative existentials is worlds do with this by of those concrete truthmakers in and it for us to focus our attention on the negative existential truths, us to see that which to be the that truth about what is not is not made true by what to the worlds are not But then them to a rejection of Max is worlds I do not think And I not some think that the of all the world, is those who my gives them a reason to Max while Truthmaker. But are that worlds are If think then I claim that these of worlds reason to Max. is against a of that that an is to have a just in it is necessary that the has the if it argues against this by considering and If an has a just in it is necessary that the has the if it then since it is necessary that to if and exist, then to is of the of But this is there is nothing about the of any that to any or that at Since this we have reason to reject the of And we have reason to reject the if we reject the existence of That if are the fact that the of has the that if then would be of our And so objection does not require the actual existence of in to have the it what gives us reason to reject the of if the existence of is The just is that whether or not

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