The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility

Alvin E. Roth

172 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

The Shapley value is shown to be a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The concept of strategic risk is introduced, and it is shown that the Shapley value of a game equals its utility if and only if the underlying preferences are neutral to both ordinary and strategic risk.

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1988A value for n -person games 1953An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility

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