Cooperative Game Theory and its Insurance Applications

Jean Lemaire

96 citations0/0 files storedAstin Bulletin

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Game Theory and Voting Systems Insurance and Financial Risk Management Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

Abstract This survey paper presents the basic concepts of cooperative game theory, at an elementary level. Five examples, including three insurance applications, are progressively developed throughout the paper. The characteristic function, the core, the stable sets, the Shapley value, the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are defined and computed for the different examples.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 96 citations exist upstream.

References

2019Theory of games and economic behavior 1950The Bargaining Problem 2015Games and Decisions 1969The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game 1975Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem 1944Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour.1979Axiomatic Models of Bargaining 1965The kernel of a cooperative game

Cited by

1998Stochastic cooperative games in insurance 2006Pareto‐Optimal Insurance Policies in the Models with a Premium Based on the Actuarial Value

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.