This paper speculates that a linear causal chain runs from the natural resource endowment to the landholding system, the type of political state, the choice of development strategy and economic performance. It suggests that resource-deficient countries tend to have peasant-dominated landholding systems which foster autonomous political states and growth-promoting economic linkages. Such countries out-perform resource-rich ones which have more varied landholding patterns which emphasise conflicts over rents and foster factional political states and weaker economic linkages. The preoccupation with rents in resource-rich countries impedes beneficial land reform and creates inefficient industry in a counter-productive effort to create non-farm jobs. Resource-deficient countries cannot afford such inefficient transfers and pursue a development strategy which uses scarce resources more effectively. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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