Domestic Systemically Important Banks: A Quantitative Analysis for the Chinese Banking System

Abstract

This paper serves as a response to the official assessment approach proposed by Basel Committee to identify domestic systemically important banks (D‐SIBs) in China. Our analysis presents not only current levels of domestic systemic importance of individual banks but also the changes. We also consider the systemic risk of the whole banking system, by investigating how D‐SIBs and non‐D‐SIBs are correlated before and after the recent financial crises using Copula. We find that the systemic importance of major banks is decreasing, while some banks becoming more systemically important should require tight regulations. D‐SIBs as a whole subsystem display stronger correlation with non‐D‐SIBs than the individual D‐SIBs, which alerts the regulatory to pay attention to “too‐many‐to‐fail” problems. Contagion effects between D‐SIBs and non‐D‐SIBs exist during the subprime crisis, but did not exist during the European debt crisis. This yields good signal of a more balanced banking system in China.

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