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Abstract Design of complex engineered systems often involves optimization of multiple competing problems that are supposed to compromise to arrive at equilibrium optima, entailing a joint optimization problem. This paper reveals the leader-follower decision structure inherent in joint optimization problems. A Stackelberg game solution is formulated to model a leader-follower joint optimization problem as a two-level optimization problem between two decision makers, implicating a mathematical program that contains sub-optimization problems as its constraints. A case study of coffee grinder green design demonstrates the potential of Stackelberg solution to joint optimization of modularity subject with conflicting goals.
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Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 6 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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