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Coherent beliefs are not always types
6 references·3 citing·29 second hop
Coherent beliefs are not always types (1999)Coherent beliefs are not always typesGames with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Games with Incomplete Informa…Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs (1998)Topology-Free Typology of Bel…The bayesian formulation of incomplete information ? The non-compact case (1993)The bayesian formulation of i…Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge (1993)Hierarchies of Beliefs and Co…Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Formulation of Bayesian analy…Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game (1968)Games with Incomplete Informa…Robust Mechanism Design (2011)Robust Mechanism DesignWhen do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs? (2009)When do type structures conta…Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability (2004)Hierarchies of Belief and Int…Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)The New Palgrave dictionary of economics (2008)Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity (1989)A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms (1999)Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity (2004)Topologies on Types (2005)Epistemic Game Theory (2014)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points (1968)Robust Mechanism Design (2005)Dynamic psychological games (2008)Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (2016)Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection (1984)Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)The Grammar of Society (2005)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Robust Control and Model Uncertainty (2001)Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine (2012)Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption (2003)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design (2019)Knowledge Spaces with Arbitrarily High Rank (1998)An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (2006)An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model2,127 cited
  • 1968Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game1,059 cited
  • 1985Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information774 cited
  • 1993Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge443 cited
  • 1998Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs152 cited
  • 1993The bayesian formulation of incomplete information ? The non-compact case75 cited

Cited by

  • 2011Robust Mechanism Design74 cited
  • 2009When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?39 cited
  • 2004Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability34 cited

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