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Dynamics of Contract Design with Screening
16 references·0 citing·51 second hop
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References

  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 2002The Theory of Incentives2,116 cited
  • 2001The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model2,041 cited
  • 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1,207 cited
  • 2008A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem719 cited
  • 1987On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting641 cited
  • 2006Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model639 cited
  • 1995Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts537 cited
  • 2007Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications360 cited
  • 1987Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade304 cited
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  • 1995Linearity with Project Selection and Controllable Diffusion Rate in Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems173 cited
  • 2008Optimal Executive Compensation when Firm Size Follows Geometric Brownian Motion150 cited
  • 2007Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time

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  • 2011Persistent Private Information118 cited
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