Subjective Rationality and the Explanation of Social Behavior

Abstract

This article discusses the central role of subjective rationality in the social sciences, particularly sociology. Actions need not produce good outcomes to be subjectively rational, but need only be carried out for reasons seen as good by the actor. The article examines a class of reasons that are both good (that is, subjectively rational) and invalid, that is, not objectively rational. An imaginary dialogue between David Hume and Anthony Downs is used to illustrate the way in which the apparent irrationality of ideology can be incorporated into subjective rationality. The social use of magic and the case of false beliefs are examined as further examples in the same class. Finally, the way in which good mental procedures can lead to false beliefs is examined.

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