The Use of Reasons in Thought (and the Use of Earmarks in Arguments)

Abstract

Here I defend my solution to the wrong-kind-of-reason problem against Mark Schroeder’s criticisms. In doing so, I highlight an important difference between other accounts of reasons and my own. While others understand reasons as considerations that count in favor of attitudes, I understand reasons as considerations that bear (or are taken to bear) on questions. Thus, to relate reasons to attitudes, on my account, we must consider the relation between attitudes and questions. By considering that relation, we not only solve the wrong-kind-of-reason problem, but we also bring into view rational agency—the use of reasons in thought.

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