The Socratic Paradox in the Protagoras

Abstract

117 The Socratic Paradox in the Protagoras DAVID GALLOP n a recent article Mr. J. P. Sullivan has discussed Protagoras 351B- 359A, with special reference to the nature and purpose of the "hedonism" in that passage. Rather than pursue this issue further, the present paper will seek to elucidate Socrates' proof, based upon "hedonism", that one who knows good and evil will necessarily do the good and avoid the evil, if he can (355A-358D). Preoccupation with the single issue of "hedonism" has perhaps led to undue neglect of the detail of these pages. Standard commentaries, at any rate, do little

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