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Out of a large number of objections that philosophers have made to what I call 'moral rights', I address only one in this lecture, and attempt to rebut it, and thus in a sense come to the defence of moral rights. But there are many other objections that are frequently made that I cannot even consider in this limited time, and for all we know, some of them may be cogent, even decisive objections. So the theory of moral rights may yet be untenable even if everything I say in this lecture is true. I do not claim to have proved that the theory is correct, or to have rebutted all the important objections to it. I attempt to make only a small point, namely that one kind of objection can be answered even if the others cannot. That is a little point, to be sure, but in philosophy the so-called big points are often just such little points strung together.
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