Myopic Solutions of Affine Dynamic Models

Matthew J. Sobel

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Game Theory and Applications Merger and Competition Analysis Supply Chain and Inventory Management

Abstract

New sufficient conditions are presented for a dynamic process to have a myopic optimum and for a sequential game to possess a myopic equilibrium point. An optimum (or an equilibrium point) is said to be myopic if it can be specified by solving a static optimization problem (or a static Nash game). The results are applied to an aquaculture harvesting model and a dynamic oligopoly model with advertising decisions.

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References

1982Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory 1953Stochastic Games 1976Optimal Advertising Policy Under Dynamic Conditions 1984Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions.1964Equilibrium in a stochastic $n$-person game 1984Optimal Pricing and Advertising Policies for New Product Oligopoly Models 1991Algorithms for stochastic games ? A survey 1981An orderfield property for stochastic games when one player controls transition probabilities

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