Anselm's Ontological Arguments

Abstract

I BELIEVE that in Anselm's Proslogion and Responsio editoris there are two different pieces of reasoning which he did not distinguish from one another, and that a good deal of light may be shed on philosophical problem of the ontological argument if we do distinguish them. In Chapter 2 of Proslogiont Anselm says that we believe that God is a greater than which cannot be conceived. (The Latin is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit. Anselm sometimes uses alternative expressions aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest, id quo maius cogitari nequit, aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet.) Even fool of Psalm who says in his heart there is no God, when he hears this very thing that Anselm says, namely, something a greater than which cannot be conceived, understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding though he does not understand that it exists. Apparently Anselm regards it as tautological to say that whatever is understood is in understanding (quidquid intelligitur in intellect est): he uses intelligitur and in intellect est as interchangeable locutions. The same holds for another formula of his: whatever is thought is in thought (quidquid cogitatur in cogitatione est) .2 Of course many things may exist in understanding that do not exist in reality; for example, elves. Now, says Anselm, a greater than which cannot be conceived exists in understanding. But it cannot exist only in understanding, for to exist in reality is greater. Therefore that thing a greater than which cannot be conceived cannot exist only in understanding, for then a greater thing could be conceived: namely, one that exists both in understanding and in reality.3

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