Abstract Defends a dynamic, or tensed, conception of time, according to which the past and the present are real while the future is not. This conception differs from traditional tensed views, according to which tensed facts are more basic than tenseless ones; on the contrary, tensed facts reduce to tenseless ones. The conception of time defended is supported by arguments from causation: there can be causation only in a world where the past and the present are real, while the future is not. Further, the direction of time can be defined by the direction of causation, and causation can be used to analyse temporal relations such as the relations of simultaneity and temporal priority. The dynamic conception of time developed is contrasted with alternative views and defended against numerous philosophical objections. It is also defended against implications of the Special Theory of Relativity: A modified version of the Special Theory of Relativity that allows for absolute simultaneity is suggested.
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