Article1982

Common sense and psychological phenomena: A reply to Smedslund

7 citations0/0 files storedScandinavian Journal of Psychology

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Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

Smedslund's argument that psycho‐social reality is revealed by common sense is shown to be based on a confusion between logical inference and psychological induction. Common sense has no privileged access to psychological reality and is affected profoundly by reasoning errors. Its structure is loose, allowing for post hoc“explanations” of everything and clear‐cut predictions of nothing.

Citations in this library

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References

1982Revising explications of common sense through dialogue: Thirty‐six psychological theorems 1982Common sense as psychosocial reality: A reply to Sjöberg 1982Logical versus psychological necessity: A discussion of the role of common sense in psychological theory

Cited by

2009The Way Brands Work: Consumers' understanding of the creation and usage of brands 1999On appropriate targets for criticism in psychology 1999The logic of Smedslund's psychologic: Applications to memory research

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