A Bayesian approach to a sequential three‐decision problem: Voting and the uses of information in electoral choice*

Abstract

This paper investigates a situation of decision‐making under risk in which an individual must select one of three actions. Substantively, an electoral example in which a citizen must decide how and whether to vote in a two‐candidate election is used to illustrate the argument. Only the value of the consequences of one action, which is to abstain from voting, is known. The expected values of voting for either candidate must be estimated based upon a sample of information. Specifically, we are interested in how one may decide when to stop gathering information and the behavioral consequences of that choice for the voting decision. The dependence of the voting decision on the original ambiguity and magnitude of the expected utilities and on the costs of information is also explored.

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