Voting in International Economic Organizations

Abstract

Since the 19th century, governments have joined to create specialized international organizations to control the effects of new technologies and to regulate increased economic ties between nations. The number of such organizations has increased dramatically since the Second World War, and it is likely that this approach to international problem solving through permanent, specialized agencies will continue. Yet for nations to act effectively in concert, the organization through which they act must command the respect of its members, and they must abide by the organization’s decisions. Moreover, the way in which these decisions are made—the formal procedures and informal practices followed by the organization’s members—will have a direct and immediate effect on the members’ observance of them. Even the generally accepted substantive rules of an organization are not likely to be observed if they are perceived as arbitrarily applied without proper voting safeguards.

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