“We are not concerned who the buyer is”: Engine sales and Anglo‐American security at the dawn of the jet age

Abstract

The de Havilland Comet, the world's first jet‐powered commercial aircraft, began service in 1952 during one of the most dangerous periods of the Cold War. The plane's second commercial version, set to fly in 1954, was powered by advanced axial flow engines of Rolls Royce design ‐ the very type of engine missing from Soviet bomber fleets. Without these engines, Soviet bombers lacked the range and power to hit targets within the continental United States. American diplomats, arguing Anglo‐American collaboration on engine development provided them the right to dictate export policy, tried to halt Britain's Comet sales to protect the security of this vital military technology. This attempt was thwarted by British planners keen to see their jet capture foreign markets years ahead of any American competition, prompting a diplomatic dispute that raged for nearly two years. This paper reviews this debate, examining Anglo‐American export controls over jet engines in the early Cold War and the importance of aviation to Anglo‐American planners during the same period, and argues that the negotiations strained London's view of its American ally.1

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