Oil PACs and Aggressive Contribution Strategies

Abstract

Scholars have found oil PACs to be the most ideological of all corporate PACs. In the 1980 elections, oil PACs contributed to Republican challengers to an extent more typical of nonconnected PACs than the usually more pragmatic corporate PACs. This study examines oil PAC contributions in the 1980 House elections. It assumes that corporate self-interest underlies even an ideological strategy; thus, actual allocation decisions are likely to be driven by both pragmatic and ideological considerations. The statistical analysis shows that to be true for oil company PACs. Although they show some tendency to be more pragmatic in contributing to incumbents and more ideological in giving to challengers, collinearity problems make conclusions on this point problematic. However, in giving to incumbents, oil PACs helped conservatives regardless of party and friends regardless of ideology; when they contributed to challengers, on the other hand, they concentrated on Republicans and opponents of influential liberal incumbents.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 101 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.