Enhancing the social ethics of psychology: Toward a psychology at the service of social change.

Abstract

When the preconditions for the existence of the and the advancement of human welfare are conspicuously deficient, it is morally incumbent upon to engage in activities that bring about a state of affairs more conducive to the well-being of the entire population. Yet, in contrast to its considerable to insure proper ethical behaviour toward individual clients, has virtually neglected its moral obligations to at large. Psychology can no doubt contribute to the advent of change by making explicit the process by which people come to accept the current order as the best possible one, and by proposing strategies to counteract this pervasive phenomenon. This article illustrates how well-established psychological research, as well as such as teachers, practitioners and investigators can play a significant role in the transformation of structures incapable of promoting human welfare for all sectors of Portrayals of the good society by philosophers usually include attributes such as stability, cohesion, freedom, material prosperity, harmony, equality, and distributive (Olson, 1978). Unfortunately, the regnant system does not satisfactorily meet some of these essential requirements for the existence of the good society. This is an argument for which, regrettably, there is abundant evidence. Philosophical (Facione, Scherer & Attig, 1978; D. Miller, 1978; Olson, 1978), political (Edwards, Reich & Weisskopf, 1986; George & Wilding, 1976; Gross, 1980), and psychosocial (Ryan, 1971, 1981; Sennet & Cobb, 1972) treatises can be found to support the claim that if human welfare for the public at large is to be fostered, fundamental changes in the order must occur. What is to do vis-a-vis this adverse state of affairs? Hitherto, it has mostly contributed not to the promotion of change, This article is based on a chapter of a doctoral dissertation submitted by the author to the University of Manitoba. I wish to thank Frederick L. Marcuse and Edwin Buettner for many fruitful discussions on this topic and for their insightful comments. I also wish to thank the Editor, John B. Conway and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Isaac Prilleltensky, Child Guidance Clinic, 700 Elgin Ave., Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada R3E 1B2. but rather to the preservation of the status quo (Anderson & Travis, 1983; Prilleltensky, 1989). Although it would be reasonable to expect that is determined to promote human welfare by engaging in activities to bring about an improvement in the preconditions for well-being, that expectation has largely not materialized. This situation is largely due to the rather narrow concept of that have adopted as their working moral code. Such a model focuses primarily on the obligations towards the individual client at the expense of proactive moral behaviour towards at large. This bias is reflected, though in differing degrees, both in the American and the Canadian ethical principles for psychologists. In the former there is very little explicit mention of duties towards (American Psychological Association, 1990). And while the latter devotes an entire section to Responsibility to Society, this obligation is considered the least important in value when in conflict with other principles (Canadian Psychological Association, 1986). In comparison to the American code of ethics, Principle IV: Responsibility to Society represents a laudable development. Yet, the Canadian code still falls short of properly addressing the dimension of our ethical duties, for if we continue to regard change as the least important of our moral values, then our clients may 310 Canadian Psychology/Psychologie canadienne, 1990, 31:4 Psychology at the Service of Social Change 311 continue to face less than optimal conditions without our active support. Serious consideration should be given as to how best to advance Principle IV to the forefront of our priorities. Although the plea to engage in action as a way of fulfilling their moral obligations with respect to goes as far back as Dewey (1900), have only recently begun to revive that plea. G.W. Albee, one of the most eloquent contemporary dedicated to the eradication of injustice, used his 1970 presidential address to the American Psychological Association to ask that psychology throw its resources into the efforts (Albee, 1970, p. 1077) to eliminate ills such as war and racism. Hillerbrand claimed recently that community discourse... [is] vital to ethical behavior (1987, p. 117). In a similar vein, Steininger, Newell and Garcia suggested that psychologists should increasingly question the values base of their activities and openly discuss questions of fairness and justice (1984, p. 217). Sarason (1982, 1984), who has been a very vocal and ardent supporter of a communityoriented psychology, has been extremely influential in resurrecting what could be called the social ethics of the discipline. In spite of these recent calls for a more attuned psychological ethics, these pleas do not seem to have been followed by programmatic action. This article is intended to contribute to bridging the gap between the vast literature dealing with moral duties towards the individual and the relatively underdeveloped area of in psychology. Two noticeable exceptions to the latter are the works by Bermant, Kelman, and Warwick (1978) The Ethics of Social Intervention, and Steininger et al. (1984) Ethical Issues in Psychology. Both books are helpful in discerning the moral dilemmas to be confronted in interventions. Yet, both seem to fall short of recommending a proactive plan of action to remedy some of the problematic situations that they so aptly describe.

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