Phenomenal Colors and Sorites

Abstract

Nontrans has been used as a stick with which to beat sense-datum theorists as well as to cast doubt on the possibility of giving a rational reconstruction of the semantics of everyday color terms. In both cases, what is called into question is the coherence of phenomenal color predicates, or, alternatively, the concept of a phenomenal color. For if we must distinguish the colors of x, y, and z by sight alone, and we require that the phenomenal color of an object be the color that the object seems to have, then if x is indistinguishable in color from y, x and y must be the same (shade of) phenomenal color. Similarly, if y is indistinguishable in color from z, y and z must be the same phenomenal color. By the transitivity of identity, we must conclude that x is the same phenomenal color as z, but since x and z are distinguishable in color, x cannot be the same phenomenal color as z. It is evident that the contradiction disappears if we abandon the conception of a phenomenal color, for it does not follow that just because x seems to be the same shadee of) color as y, and y seems to be the same color as z, that x must then seem to be the

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