Governing at the frontier of the European commission: The case of seconded national officials

Abstract

Studies of executive institutions have largely dealt separately with national and international executive institutions (IEIs). This study unpacks and repacks four conflicting decision-making dynamics that unfold at the frontier of IEIs – that is, at the institutional rim where national and international executive institutions meet, interact and collide. The empirical laboratory utilised is seconded national experts in the European Commission. The survey and interview data presented demonstrate that the decision-making behaviour of seconded national experts in the Commission includes a mix of departmental (portfolio), epistemic (expert) and supranational behaviour. The suspicion early voiced by Coombes (1970 Coombes, D. 1970. Politics and Bureaucracy of the European Union, London: George Allen and Unwin. [Google Scholar]) that seconded national experts to the European Commission are highly conscious of their national background and that they represent domestic Trojan horses in the European Commission is thus challenged by this study. Arguably, the decision-making behaviour evoked by seconded national officials in the Commission is strongly affected by organisational characteristics of the Commission itself and less by the member-state administrations from which the secondees originate.

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