A Comparison of Prices Brought by English Auctions and Private Negotiations

Kenneth M. Lusht

88 citations0/0 files storedReal Estate Economics

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Housing Market and Economics Art History and Market Analysis Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

A comparison of house prices brought by English auctions and private negotiations produced evidence that the pricing mechanism matters. In an active market for middle‐ to high‐priced houses, auctions extracted higher prices than private negotiations.

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1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS 1981Optimal Auction Design 1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding 1986Auctions and Bidding 1977A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition 1981Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions 1987Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders 1983Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes

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