America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy

Abstract

Reviewed by: America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy Dalal Hasan (bio) America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, by Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 245 pages. $22.95. Fifty years from now, the impact of George W. Bush's presidency on post-September 11 foreign policy will certainly provide abundant inspiration for a plethora of Ph.D. dissertations. For now, without the benefit of hindsight, speculation on the implication and underpinnings of this administration's policies is finding its home in bookstores and is being written while history is still playing itself out. Real time analyses such as that provided by America Unbound are thus limited by the unpredictability of future events, but James Lindsay and Ivo Daalder have endeavored to write just such an interpretation of what they call the Bush "revolution" in American foreign policy. They tackle head-on many of the questions that have filled editorials and news panels over the past three years, from the ideological underpinnings of the Bush team to the more controversial questions of whether or not George W. Bush is really the man behind the wheel or simply a passenger in a hegemonic American monster truck driven by neo-conservatives. They conclude by asking whether this revolution has made the United States better off or worse. America Unbound argues that the Bush presidency did indeed revolutionize American foreign policy, not in terms of its goals, "but rather in how to achieve them." Leaving behind "traditional" precepts that have guided American foreign policy since World War II, the Bush administration chose unilateralism over multilateralism, exchanged trust in treaties and international law for power and pre-emption, and replaced long term alliances and cooperation with ad-hoc coalitions of the willing. What makes this combination revolutionary? Lindsay and Daalder recognize that the history of American foreign policy is one that never shied from unilateral action when multilateral approaches failed to implement or fulfill U.S. goals. Rather, they argue that the Bush administration abandoned the "hallmark" of American foreign policy established under the Truman administration, which was based on a blend of "power and cooperation." In place of this, the Bush administration made unilateralism and pre-emption not merely a last resort, but a clear doctrine defining its foreign policy approach to pursuing American national security. Who defined this approach, and who was the ultimate decision-maker in guiding its implementation? Lindsay and Daalder's answer is clear and resounding: this is a President whose CEO-style management has been calculated and defined from the beginning. They counter the picture of a President who failed campaign pop quizzes on foreign policy with a picture of the day after—in which he amassed the "Vulcan" team of policy experts to fill in the gaping voids in his foreign affairs vocabulary. The message: Bush may not be a political scientist or foreign affairs expert, but he knows how to make effective decisions and how to implement them through a team. His advisors provided [End Page 198] him with information and articulation of his goals, but he ultimately defined and decided upon them. Underlying these decisions were a set of guiding principles rooted in a hegemonic view of America's role in the world: ". . . America's immense power and willingness to wield it, even over the objections of others, is the key to securing America's interests in the world." The pursuit of maintaining a free hand for American policy in all situations outweighed any of the diplomatic and even security risks which resulted as fallout from Bush administration policies. Ideologically driven by "assertive nationalism" and a realist approach to the projection of U.S. power abroad, this administration pushed ahead with unilateralist actions, defiantly ignoring international objections to American policies. The administration's confidence lay in the firm belief that American leadership alone would make the world safe for democracy and freedom, protected from the horror of terrorism and nuclear weapons. Ultimately Lindsay and Daalder come down in opposition to this policy, arguing that "the fundamental premise of the Bush revolution—that America's security rested on an America unbound—was mistaken." Three years into...

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