Through Thick and Thin: Good and Its Determinates

Christine Tappolet

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thick’ concepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better understood as one between a determinable and its determinates, whereas concepts such as courageous can be analysed in terms of affective concepts and purely descriptive concepts.

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References

1968The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.1979Virtue and Reason 1963The Language of Morals 1986Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 1978Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?1984Spreading the word 1956Good and Evil 1997The Right and the Good

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