Earnings Management to Reduce Earnings Variability: Evidence from Bank Loan Loss Provisions

Abstract

Prior research demonstrates that share prices reflect a risk premium that is associated with earnings variability. This suggests that managers can reduce the cost of capital and increase share prices by reducing earnings variability. In this study, we investigate bank managers' use of discretion in estimating loan loss provisions (LLP) to reduce earnings variability. We find that banks with relatively high pre‐managed earnings have positive discretionary LLP and banks with relatively low pre‐managed earnings have negative discretionary LLP, results that are consistent with the hypothesis of earnings management to reduce earnings variability. In addition, we find that bank managers' decisions to reduce earnings variability are related to the need for external financing and to gains and losses on the sale of securities which serve as substitutes for accomplishing their objective of earnings variability reduction.

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