On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-unit Auctions

Motty Perry · Philip J. Reny

107 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

It is shown that the linkage principle (Milgrom and Weber (1982)) does not extend to the multi-unit auction setting. An analysis of the equilibium bidding strategies is carried out for the general two-agent/two-unit Vickrey auction in order to provide economic insight into the nature of the failure.

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1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS 1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding 2004An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects 1994Selling Spectrum Rights 1996Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing

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