The goal of this study is to analyze the incidence of dominant owners in the probability of the presence of political directors and the effect of said presence on firm value. The study uses a sample of non-financial Spanish companies listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange over the period 2003–2012. The results show that around half of the firms have at least one ex-politician on their board of directors. Furthermore, the results indicate that dominant shareholders’ voting rights and family nature have a negative effect on the likelihood of having ex-politicians on the board of directors. Moreover, the results show that the presence of political connections positively affects firm value. Further analyses show that this relationship is dependent upon the nature of the dominant owner, the use of pyramidal structures, the tenure of board members and the political directors’ ownership stake.
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