Capital Market Implications of Corporate Disclosure: German Evidence

Michael Grüning

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Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Financial Reporting and XBRL

Abstract

Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between annual report disclosure, market liquidity, and capital cost for firms registered on the Deutsche Börse. Disclosure is comprehensively measured using the innovative Artificial Intelligence Measurement of Disclosure (AIMD). Results show that annual report disclosure enhances market liquidity by changing investors’ expectations and inducing portfolio adjustments. Trading frictions are negatively associated with disclosure. The study provides evidence for a capital-cost-reduction effect of disclosure based on the analysis of investors’ return requirements and market values. Altogether, no evidence is found that the information processing at the German capital market is structurally different from other markets.

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References

1964CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*1990Basic Content Analysis 1965The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets 2001Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature 1975THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.]1996Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies 1986Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread 1995

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