Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old Methods

Gérard Gaudet · Stephen Walter Salant

117 citations0/0 files storedThe Review of Economic Studies

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Game Theory and Applications Merger and Competition Analysis Economic theories and models

Abstract

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium. Previous uniqueness results have depended on an assumption of non-degeneracy of equilibrium. As we illustrate, this assumption often fails in multi-stage games with proper Cournot subgames. Since our uniqueness results do not depend on this assumption, they are more widely applicable.

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1985On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium 1989Theories of oligopoly behavior

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