A Buddhist Explanation of Episodic Memory: From Self to Mind

Monima Chadha

6 citations0/0 files storedAsian Philosophy

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Indian and Buddhist Studies Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that some of the work to be done by the concept of self is done by the concept of mind in Buddhist philosophy. For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus on an account of memory and its ownership. The task of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu’s heroic effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. For this, I will discuss Vasubandhu’s theory of mind in the early Abhidharma as well as post-Abhidharma period to show the continuity in his work.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 6 citations exist upstream.

References

1739A Treatise of Human Nature 2002Individuals 1979Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics 2007The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness 2012The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness 2003Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons 2012Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity 2007Asian perspectives: Indian theories of mind

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.