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ABSTRACT The consequences of international firm ownership for strategic trade policy are examined both in a general and in a simple linear model of an international duopoly with two governments using production subsidies as policy instruments. At first sight, the case for strategic trade policy seems to be weakened, because international ownership reduces a government's incentive for rent‐shifting. Closer inspection shows, however, that there are ownership structures leading to optimal policies which induce the duopolists to behave more collusively. This tends to resolve the conflict between national and international rationality in a policy game with retaliation and makes strategic trade policy look more attractive.
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