The weakness of strong ties: Collective action failure in a highly cohesive group*

Abstract

Following Homans, exchange theorists have modeled informal social control as an exchange of peer approval for compliance with group obligations. The exchange model predicts higher compliance in cohesive networks with strong social ties. However, previous specifications failed to incorporate bilateral exchange of approval. Computer simulations using a Bush‐Mosteller stochastic learning model show that bilateral exchanges evolve more readily than multilateral, causing social control to flow into the maintenance of interpersonal relationships at the expense of compliance with group obligations, a structural form of the “second‐order free‐rider problem.”

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